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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3729 
___________ 
 
WILLIAM DYKEMAN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
ABU AHSAN, M.D.; UMDNJ; JOHN DOES, UNDMJ; JOHN DOES-HEALTHCARE 
PROVIDER; UMDNJ; NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; DR. 
AHMAR SHAKIR; JOHN DOES, employed as an Administrator or Supervisor; JOHN 
AND JANE DOES, employed in various capacities for the NJ Department of Corrections 
and/or UMDNJ 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Civil No. 3-12-cv-04634) 
District Judge:  Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 15, 2019 
 
Before: KRAUSE, SCIRICA and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 12, 2019) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Pro se appellant William Dykeman appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of 
several of his claims and its grant of summary judgment in favor of the remaining 
defendant in an action Dykeman brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  Dykeman is presently incarcerated at Northern State Prison in New 
Jersey.  When he entered the prison in 2005, he began experiencing pain in his right hip 
stemming from an earlier injury.  Several medical professionals evaluated Dykeman 
between 2005-2008; they examined him, ordered diagnostic testing, and requested shoe 
insoles for him. 
In December 2008, Dykeman first saw defendant Dr. Abu Ahsan, who ordered an 
x-ray, an extra mattress, and insoles for him.  Dr. Ahsan next saw Dykeman in June 2009 
and requested a prosthetic consultation; the request was denied the following month.  In 
September 2009, Dykeman received a letter from the Health Services Unit informing him 
that it had a record of Dr. Ahsan’s mattress order, that mattress orders are processed by 
the New Jersey Department of Corrections, and that a manager was looking into why the 
order had not yet been fulfilled.  The letter also noted that the review committee had 
denied Dr. Ahsan’s request for a prosthetic consultation.  Dr. Ahsan explained these 
developments to Dykeman in December 2009. 
In April 2010, Dr. Ahsan again ordered insoles and an x-ray for Dykeman, and 
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requested an orthopedic evaluation.  Dykeman requested cushioned shoes from Dr. 
Ahsan in July 2011.  At some point between 2008-2011, Dykeman received shoe inserts, 
but Dykeman testified at a deposition that he did not know exactly when he received 
them or from whom, and that he felt that they were not supportive enough.  He testified 
that he has never received an extra mattress.  In Dykeman’s visits with Dr. Ahsan and 
other medical providers, Dykeman chose not to pursue several different treatment options 
for his injury and often declined pain medication. 
In July 2012, Dykeman filed a complaint alleging that his Eighth Amendment 
rights were violated by Dr. Ahsan and other defendants in the course of treating his hip.  
The District Court screened and dismissed Dykeman’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  After Dykeman appealed, we affirmed the majority of the dismissal 
but vacated and remanded the case in part after concluding that Dykeman had pleaded 
sufficient facts to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on his allegations that he had 
not received an additional mattress and cushioned footwear as prescribed by Dr. Ahsan 
and that Dr. Ahsan had failed to renew the mattress prescription. 
 On remand, Dykeman filed an amended complaint, in which he re-asserted his 
earlier claims about his medical care and his claims against Dr. Ahsan; he also raised 
several new claims.  In October 2014, the District Court dismissed all of Dykeman’s 
claims except for those against Dr. Ahsan regarding the mattress and footwear 
prescriptions.  The parties completed discovery, and Dr. Ahsan moved for summary 
judgment.  The District Court granted Dr. Ahsan’s motion.  Dykeman timely appealed. 
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II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Dykeman’s claims.  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  In reviewing a dismissal for failure to state 
a claim, “we accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d 
Cir. 2011).  Dismissal is appropriate “if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the 
complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court 
finds that [the] plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.”  Id. 
We also exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014).  
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  A genuine dispute of material fact exists if the evidence is sufficient for a 
reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.  Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
III. 
 Dykeman first challenges the District Court’s dismissal of his claims against an 
orthopedic doctor and several unidentified medical providers who had no apparent 
involvement in the fulfillment of his mattress and footwear prescriptions.  Additionally, 
Dykeman claims that some kind of racketeering conspiracy prevented him from receiving 
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the mattress and footwear that he was prescribed.1 
 The District Court properly dismissed Dykeman’s first set of claims, as they were 
beyond the scope of our remand order.  Our prior opinion already addressed Dykeman’s 
claims about the medical care he received beyond the fulfillment of his mattress and 
footwear prescriptions.  The District Court clearly laid out the parameters of the remand 
for Dykeman before he submitted his amended complaint, yet Dykeman included 
numerous claims that were unrelated to his mattress and footwear allegations. 
As for Dykeman’s conspiracy claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), his 
undeveloped and conclusory allegations of a conspiracy by a number of mostly 
unidentified individuals are insufficient to state a claim.  See Farber v. City of Paterson, 
440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Section 1985(3) permits an action to be brought by 
one injured by a conspiracy formed ‘for the purpose of depriving, either directly or 
indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal 
privileges and immunities under the laws.’”) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)).  At no point 
has Dykeman clarified his conspiracy allegations.  Accordingly, the District Court 
correctly dismissed these claims.  Additionally, under the circumstances, permitting 
                                              
1  In his appellate brief, Dykeman also makes a number of vague new allegations and 
claims about his medical care, and re-asserts allegations that are not relevant to his claims 
about the provision of an extra mattress and cushioned footwear.  We will not consider 
his new allegations, as they appear for the first time on appeal.  See In re Diet Drugs 
Prod. Liab. Litig., 706 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2013).  Additionally, any new allegations 
that could be construed to relate to Dykeman’s mattress and footwear prescriptions all 
involve facts of which he was aware years before he filed his amended complaint. 
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further amendment would have been futile.  See U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. AstraZeneca 
Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 2014). 
The District Court also properly granted summary judgment for Dr. Ahsan.2  The 
Supreme Court has held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of 
prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . proscribed by 
the Eighth Amendment.”  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  “In order to state 
a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to 
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”  Id. at 106.  Establishing a 
claim requires proving both an objective component — “a serious medical need”—and a 
subjective component — “acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate 
                                              
2  We also conclude that the District Court’s denial of Dykeman’s motion for 
appointment of counsel was not an abuse of discretion.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 
158 (3d Cir. 1993).  Dykeman contends that the appointment of counsel was necessary 
for the resolution of his claim against Dr. Ahsan because he needed an attorney to secure 
the testimony of an expert witness.  See Appellant’s Br. at ECF p. 44.  However, 
Dykeman does not explain what kind of expert testimony could have been relevant to his 
deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Ahsan, which does not require expert testimony 
to resolve. 
 We similarly find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s discovery orders 
that Dykeman challenges on appeal.  See Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 
261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010).  In particular, Dykeman argues that he was subject to an unfair 
process when the District Court permitted Dr. Ahsan to take his deposition testimony.  
See Appellant’s Br. at ECF p. 46.  Dykeman notes that Dr. Ahsan relied on this testimony 
in arguing that he was entitled to summary judgment, but Dykeman has not shown that 
the District Court’s decision itself prejudiced him.  See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 281.  
Rather, information from Dykeman was necessary to develop the facts underlying his 
claims. 
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indifference to that need.”  Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d 
Cir. 2003). 
Dykeman contests Dr. Ahsan’s role in his failure to receive a mattress and 
cushioned footwear.  The record is clear that Dr. Ahsan attempted to secure both an 
additional mattress and prosthetics for Dykeman.  However, a review committee denied 
the prosthetic consultation and for some unknown reason which did not involve Dr. 
Ahsan, the mattress request was never fully processed. 
Dr. Ahsan provided comprehensive medical treatment for Dykeman otherwise, 
and Dykeman received shoe insoles at some point, although he does not believe that they 
were sufficiently supportive.  While Dykeman was waiting to receive an additional 
mattress and cushioned footwear, Dr. Ahsan and other medical professionals repeatedly 
offered therapeutic treatment for Dykeman, including pain medication, steroid injections, 
additional diagnostic procedures, and specialist consultations.  However, Dykeman 
refused several of these options.  See U.S. ex rel. Walker v. Fayette County, 599 F.2d 
573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (“Where a prisoner has received some medical 
attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are 
generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims 
which sound in state tort law.”). 
There is no evidence in the record that indicates that a renewed prescription for an 
additional mattress by Dr. Ahsan would have resulted in a different outcome for 
Dykeman where Dykeman was informed that Dr. Ahsan’s original request was being 
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processed.  Rather, the record indicates that Dr. Ahsan had no control over whether 
Dykeman actually received either a mattress or cushioned footwear, but attempted to 
secure both.  Under these circumstances, there is no evidence that Dr. Ahsan acted with 
deliberate indifference to Dykeman.  See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.  Summary judgment 
for Dr. Ahsan was proper.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.3 
 
                                              
3  Dr. Ahsan’s motion to supplement the appendix is granted. 
